La rivoluzione dimenticata. Il pensiero scientifico greco e la scienza moderna. By Lucio Russo  by Netz, Reviel
72 REVIEWS HMAT 29
2. Reidemeister, K. 1932. Knotentheorie, Ergebnisse der Mathematik und ihrer Grenzgebiete, Vol. 1. Berlin:
Springer-Verlag.
3. Rheinberger, H.-J. 1992. Experiment, Differenz, Schrift: Zur Geschichte epistemischer Dinge. Marburg:
Basilisken-Presse.
doi:10.1006/hmat.2001.2309
La rivoluzione dimenticata. Il pensiero scientifico greco e la scienza moderna. By
Lucio Russo. Preface by Marcello Cini. Milan (Feltrinelli). 1998. 383 pp. 42,000 Lire.
Reviewed by Reviel Netz
Department of Classics, Bldg. 20, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305-2080
The “Revolution” referred to in Russo’s title is no less than the Scientif c Revolution.
Hardly forgotten, readers might say. In fact, so Russo claims with great persuasive vigor,
we have forgotten the true time and place this revolution took place. This was not West-
ern Europe of the 16th–17th centuries, but the eastern Mediterranean of the third century
B.C. Russo bases his argument on an interpretation of the scientif c method. Essentially,
this is a Popperian version of the hypothetico-deductive model, consisting of construct-
ing theoretical domains, producing conclusions according to mathematical reasoning, and
interpreting and testing those conclusions by appealing to empirical realizations. He ar-
gues that all the components of this method were put in place in the Hellenistic world: so
this is when science came to be. Not in the Classical period. (This did not have empirical
realizations, and it merely anticipated the achievements of the Hellenistic world in math-
ematical reasoning.) Nor later than the third century B.C. (as the shadow of the Roman
Empire grows, Russo detects a steep intellectual decline). Certainly not at the so-called
scientif c revolution—which merely brought back to life the Hellenistic methods it knew
from its literary sources. (Often—a theme of Russo’s approach—these sources were made
in Roman times, mere second-rate ref ections of Hellenistic achievements.)
The book is among a handful of truly marvelously written books in the f eld of early
science (Van der Waerden’s Science Awakening immediately comes to mind), and it was
accordingly a great success with the Italian public. The community of historians of math-
ematics should be grateful for Russo for this achievement, and should hope that the book
gets quickly translated into other major languages. It will serve as excellent reading in
a survey of the history of science, besides of course offering an important thesis, well
worth our critical attention. There are many particular points I welcome in Russo’s book,
of which I now mention just three. First, it belongs to a new wave of studies of Greek
mathematics, where emphasis shifts from the Classical antecedents to the Hellenistic ex-
tant sources themselves. As this shift gets us from speculation into facts, it is of obvious
methodological value. (For this shift in general, see [Saito 1998].) Second, Russo is right, I
think, to highlight a problem that was largely overlooked by the scholarship—that is, how
exactly did Greek science get forgotten? From Roman times right through the 17th cen-
tury, throughout the history of Mediterranean and European civilizations, to do science was
to study Greeks. Authors as different from each other as Vitruvius, Avicenna, or Newton
HMAT 29 REVIEWS 73
all explicitly modeled themselves on Greek sources, dedicating much skill and effort to
understanding the Greeks: while, for today’s practicing scientists, Greek science barely
exists. Somehow, a process of forgetting must have occurred in between. We should try to
explain how this has happened and, thanks to Russo, the problem may now be addressed.
Third and f nally, whatever we may think of the narrative Russo offers for the entire his-
tory of Western science, I feel we ought to applaud him for offering it. We may often be
wary today, as professional historians, of suggesting all-encompassing models of historical
progress and decline. Yet the play of the history ofWestern sciencewas not entirely episodic.
Some structure might, and therefore should, be discerned in it. Indeed, Russo cannot be
much wrong in ascribing a major role, in this play, to the Greeks. If the book helps to renew
interest in such grand narratives, it will have made a very interesting contribution.
I am ultimately unpersuaded by Russo’s main thesis, for three main reasons. First, I think
Russo puts too much stress on a single period. Brief y, I f nd his dismissal of non-Hellenistic
science unmotivated.We simply cannot datemuch ancient sciencewith any accuracy.While
something profound clearly changed roughly between the f fth and the fourth centuries B.C.,
works in the main Greek scientif c tradition were written from the fourth century onward,
throughout antiquity, reaching (with important modif cations, of course) into Late Ancient,
Arabic, and Latin science. Second, I thinkRusso puts toomuch stress on a singlemethod. In-
deed, it is not totally far-fetched to detect a hypothetico-deductive science in some works by
Archimedes (though even there I tend to see a more purely abstract mathematical thinking),
But taken in their historical context, such works belonged to a wider domain of persuasive
writings. Hypothetico-deductive sciencemay have its roots inGreece—but the roots are tan-
gled, as it were, leading to surprising places such as puremathematics, speculativemedicine,
and rhetoric. Third and f nally, I thinkRussoputs toomuch stress on a single historicalmodel.
The claim that the scientif c revolution was “Greek” is based on what may be considered an
etymological approach to history: as if to detect roots were the same as to offer explanations.
But what if the very same things change their meanings according to their contexts? When
we give an etymology for a word we hardly ever explain its real meaning, past or present,
as such meanings depend on a synchronic network of connotations. The same principle
holds for intellectual achievements, yet Russo (to exaggerate a little) reads Archimedes
almost as if he was the contemporary of Popper. Archimedes was not, and his works
meant, to ancient readers, something different from what they would mean if written today.
Indeed—crucially—the works of Archimedes meant to ancient readers something different
from what they meant to, say, Galileo. Perhaps, then, the scientif c revolution consisted just
in this: in differently reading Archimedes? A truly forgotten revolution! Thanks to Russo,
we may begin to think through such issues: it is appropriate to end, then, on a note of
gratitude to this f ne, stimulating book.
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